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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO : Case No. 20030332-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (2002), in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
William W. Barrett, Judge, presiding.1 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from convictions 
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
1
 A copy of the minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is included in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under the principle of Due Process and the Discovery Rule, the State is required 
to give the defendant information about potential exculpatory witnesses. However, the 
State did not give Appellant Santiago Diaz Crespo the names of several witnesses that 
were interviewed by police at the crime scene. In these circumstances, did the trial court 
err in failing to grant the defense counsel's motion for a mistrial or other remedy? 
Standard of Review: Overall, a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59,1J46; 27 P.3d 1133; State v. 
Wach, 2001 UT 35,1J45, 24 P.3d 948. However, the legal standards applied by the trial 
court in denying the motion are reviewed for correctness. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 
Tf31, 37 P.3d 1073. Also, the trial court's underlying determination that Mr. Crespo's due 
process rights were not violated is reviewed for correctness. State v. Morgan, 2000 UT 
App.48,U8,997P.2d910. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 134 [69-72]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Due Process provision of the Federal Constitution is relevant to the issue on 
appeal. That provision provides: 
nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of l aw. . . . 
2 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The Due Process provision of the Utah Constitution is relevant to the issue on 
appeal. That provision provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is relevant to the issue on 
appeal. The text of that Rule is included in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 27, 2002, Mr. Crespo was charged by Information with two counts 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. R. 2-3. Soon after, Mr. Crespo filed a 
formal discovery request. R. 16-18. Among other things, he asked the State for: any 
evidence tending to negate or mitigate his guilt; the names, addresses, telephone 
numbers, and criminal records of witnesses that may be called to testify at trial; and any 
reports involved in the investigation of this case. R. 16-17. In response, some 
information, including two toxicology reports, was provided to defense counsel. R. 137 
[6-7]. 
The preliminary hearing was held on December 10, 2002. R. 137. At the hearing, 
the defense counsel asked the police witness for all of the written information relevant to 
this case. IcL at 7-8. The witness mentioned only the two toxicology reports already 
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provided to the defense, and one police report written by Sergeant Michael Ross. IcL at 6-
8. The defense counsel did not have a copy of Sergeant Ross' report, so she requested a 
copy. id. Later, the State filed a "Notice of Supplemental Discovery Response," formally 
informing the defense counsel of the report, and providing her with a copy. R. 24-25. 
The defense counsel did not ever receive notice of any other police report. 
On February 11, 2003 the trial was held. R. 134 [1]. During the trial, it became 
apparent that another police report had been written. Id. at 65-66. This report contained 
the names and possibly other information of witnesses at the crime scene. Id. These 
witnesses had been charged with crimes related to the possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Id, at 66. However, they had been charged under a different case number than Mr. 
Crespo, and the report containing the witnesses' names and addresses had been filed with 
the witnesses' case. IdL This report was then overlooked in providing discovery in Mr. 
Crespo's case. Id The defense counsel did not learn of this report containing information 
about the witnesses until trial, and she never received a copy of this report. Id_ at 70. 
After learning of the report, the defense counsel requested either a mistrial or a 
dismissal of the charges. Id. at 69. She explained: 
I do have [Sergeant Ross's report] but apparently there's another report and 
it sounds like there's some potential witnesses that could be out there, some 
names of people that I don't know who they are. I was never told who they 
were. I was never given that information. Those are potential witnesses for 
my client and I was not given the names of those individuals. I was given 
the names of Mr. Lucero and Mr. Pollock and that is i t . . . . My 
understanding, and understanding from the evidence at the preliminary 
hearing was that they never asked them their names, they never questioned 
4 
them. 
Id. at 70-71. The trial court denied the motion, opining that Mr. Crespo was not 
prejudiced by the State's failure to provide this information. Id_ at 72. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance. R. 96-97. Mr. Crespo filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. 114-15. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 2002 Mr. Crespo went to an apartment near downtown, Salt 
Lake to pick up his friend, Maria. R. 134 [74]. Maria asked him to wait for her for a few 
minutes. Id. He sat down to wait, and someone offered him a beer. Id. He drank the beer. 
Id. When he was finished, he was told he could get another beer from the kitchen. Id_ He 
went to the fridge for the beer. Id. at 79. 
Meanwhile, the police had received a complaint that loud talking and music was 
coming from the apartment. Id. at 21. Sergeant Ross and two other detectives, Detective 
Nicholas Schneider and another detective, went to the apartment to investigate. Id. They 
arrived about 10:30 p.m. and knocked on the door. Id. The renter, Adolph Lucero, 
opened the door and stepped out into the hallway. Id. The police told him they had 
received a complaint about noise from the apartment, and asked to come inside. Id. at 22. 
Mr. Lucero gave them permission to enter. Id. 
Sergeant Ross followed Mr. Lucero into the apartment, and Detective Schneider 
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came in immediately behind Sergeant Ross. Id. at 22, 54. Sergeant Ross testified that, as 
he entered, he looked to his right and saw about five people in a living room area. Id_ at 
22. He looked to his left and saw one man, Mr. Crespo, standing in a small kitchen area. 
Id. at 22, 25. Sergeant Ross testified that Mr. Crespo's "hands went back to his pants." 
Id. at 26. Sergeant Ross told Mr. Crespo to keep his hands out in the open. Id . Sergeant 
Ross testified that "[a]t that point, [Mr. Crespo's] hand came out and went down in a 
motion and I saw the two plastic twist[s] fall out of his hand." Id_ They were small, 
white, plastic objects. Id Sergeant Ross told Detective Schneider that he saw Mr. Crespo 
drop some items. Id at 55. However, Detective Schneider did not see Mr. Crespo drop 
the items. Id. 
Sergeant Ross told Detective Schneider to "hold onto" Mr. Crespo. IdL at 55. 
Detective Schneider had Mr. Crespo face the wall and put his hands on the wall. Id . Then 
Sergeant Ross pointed out the items that he said he saw fall.2 At this point, Mr. Crespo 
told the police that these items were not his. IdL at 46. Further, at trial, he testified that he 
did not throw those twists, and he did not know they were there until the officer found 
them on the floor. Id. at 77. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Crespo was taken into custody. The police did not read him his 
Miranda rights. Ld at 44. Detective Schneider testified that this was because they didn't 
2
 Id The substances in the twists were field tested. R. 137 
[7]. The substance in one twist tested positive for cocaine and the substance in the other tested 
positive for heroin. Id 
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question him. Id 
The police continued to search the apartment. They found drug paraphernalia 
around the apartment and on other people that were there. Id. at 42-43. They got the 
names of the individuals in the apartment, and they gathered the evidence. Id_ at 64-67. 
Two individuals besides Mr. Crespo were arrested, and the others received paraphernalia 
citations. Id at 64-66. 
Mr. Crespo's case was filed separately from the others', and different reports were 
made for each case. Id at 68-69. However, the defense counsel was not informed of this 
situation. Only the report filed in Mr. Crespo's case was provided to the defense counsel, 
and it contained the names of only two of the witnesses interviewed by police at the 
crime scene. Id. at 70. The defense counsel received the names of only two witnesses. Id. 
Therefore, the defense counsel did not ever receive information held by the State about 
potential exculpatory witnesses. 
Mr. Crespo was convicted as charged. R. 109-10. He is currently incarcerated at 
the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In violation of Due Process and the Discovery Rule, the State failed to give Mr. 
Crespo the names and contact information of witnesses that the police interviewed at the 
crime scene. In fact, Mr. Crespo did not learn of these interviews until the trial, when a 
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police witness testified that the names and other information of witnesses had been 
written in a report that was filed with a different case. R. 134 [65]. Further, the trial court 
refused the defense counsel's request for a mistrial or a dismissal of the charges, saying 
that the information in the report was probably not relevant and that Mr. Crespo was not 
prejudiced by this lack of information. Id. at 71-72. As a result, Mr. Crespo was 
completely denied the opportunity to obtain and examine the information and use it in his 
defense. 
This violates Due Process and the Discovery Rule. It is well-settled that Due 
Process is violated when the prosecution suppresses material evidence that may be 
favorable to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). And, the names 
and contact information of witnesses at the crime scene, along with possible statements 
from these witnesses, are material evidence. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921-22 (Utah 
1987). So, this information should have been provided to the defense counsel regardless 
of which case number was assigned to the report, and regardless of where the report was 
filed. 
Additionally, under the Discovery Rule, Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the report should have been disclosed. Rule 16 requires the disclosure of any 
exculpatory materials discovered by investigating officers during their investigation. 
State v. Pliego. 1999 UT 8,1fl8, 974 P.2d 279; State v. Sprv. 2001 UT App 75, [^14, 21 
P.3d 675. And, police discovered the names and other information of witnesses at the 
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crime scene during the course of their investigation. So, this information should have 
been disclosed to Mr. Crespo. Utah R. Crim. P. 16 (2003). 
Finally, the State's failure to give Mr. Crespo this information was prejudicial to 
his case. If Mr. Crespo had known of these witnesses, he could have conducted his own 
interviews with them. Corroborating witnesses would have strengthened his testimony of 
the events immeasurably, and the outcome of the case would likely have been different. 
Without the information about the witnesses, however, Mr. Crespo was unable to 
significantly develop this defense, and his case was prejudiced. Because of this, this case 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial with proper discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE NAMES OF WITNESSES 
AT THE CRIME SCENE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE 
DISCOVERY RULE 
Under Due Process and the Discovery Rule, the State should have given Mr. 
Crespo the names of the witnesses who were in the apartment where he was arrested. The 
police took these names during the investigation of the activity at the apartment, and so 
the prosecutor had ready access to this information. R. 134 [65]. And, Mr. Crespo asked 
for such information in a formal discovery request made under the Discovery Rule. 
Further, the witnesses' names were material evidence in this case. R. 134 [25, 62-64]. 
Indeed, the testimonies of these witnesses may have been exculpatory evidence in Mr. 
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Crespo's defense. Because of this, Mr. Crespo had the right under Due Process and the 
Discovery Rule to this information. 
This is shown by the law. First of all, it is a violation of Due Process for the 
prosecution to withhold material evidence that is favorable or potentially favorable to a 
criminal defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This is because, as the 
United States Supreme Court emphasized, the point of a trial is to arrive at the truth, not 
simply to convict someone: 
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal 
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly.... A prosecution that withholds evidence on 
demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate 
him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the 
defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a 
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice . . . . " 
Id. at 87-88. The Utah Supreme Court has agreed: 
To meet basic standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is a real quest 
for truth and not simply a contest between the parties to win, a defendant's 
request for information which has been voluntarily complied with, or a 
court order of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing request. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). Because of this, it is the prosecutor's 
absolute duty "under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to 
provide, without request by the defendant, all exculpatory evidence." State v. Rugebregt. 
965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). See also State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, TJ32, 37 
P.3d 1073; Carter, 707 P.2d at 662. 
In particular, the Due Process discovery requirements are meant to bring to light 
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exculpatory testimony by witnesses. Brady. 373 U.S. at 87. In fact, when the prosecutor 
withholds the names of witnesses, it is not necessary for the defense to prove that their 
testimonies are exculpatory. It must be shown only that they are potentially exculpatory. 
See Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^ [33 (noting case law recognizing that evidence need only be 
potentially exculpatory). So, the fact that the defense counsel in this case was unable to 
provide the trial court with summaries of the witnesses' testimonies does not justify the 
prosecutor's failure to provide the names and other known information about them. Nor 
does it justify the trial court's failure to grant a continuance or a mistrial to give the 
defense time to obtain this information. 
This is supported by the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Bisner. Id. In Bisner, 
the prosecutor failed to disclose that he had agreed with certain witnesses not to 
prosecute them if they would testify against the defendant. Id. at ^ [31. The defendant was 
convicted and appealed on the basis of the failure to disclose. On appeal, the Court noted 
that the federal Sixth Circuit Court had recognized that both exculpatory and potentially 
exculpatory information must be revealed to the defense. IdL. at ^ [33. This is because 
failing to disclose undermines confidence about whether the defendant had a fair trial: 
[The] purpose of [the Brady rule] is not to displace the adversary system as 
the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a 
miscarriage of justice does not occur. Thus, the prosecutor is not required 
to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence 
favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of 
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a fair trial[.]3 
In other words, a fairer trial is ensured if the prosecutor discloses potentially exculpatory 
evidence because the prosecutor does not have a strong interest in developing such 
evidence, and has no legal obligation to do so.4 However, a defendant does. 
For this reason, the rule that either exculpatory or potentially exculpatory evidence 
must be disclosed makes sense as a practical matter. After all, the prosecution is not 
required to conduct an investigation on behalf of the defense. Pliego . 1999 UT 8, ^ jlO-12. 
Indeed, it may often be the case that the prosecution has the names and addresses of 
potential witnesses, but never interviews them. So, a fairer case is presented if the 
prosecutor is required to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence, such as the names or 
other information of witnesses at the crime scene. 
To determine whether a prosecutor has withheld information in violation of Due 
Process, a two-part test is applied. Under that test, a violation occurs if information "(1) 
remains unknown to the defense both before and throughout trial and (2) is material and 
exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 'reasonable probability' that 
3
 IcL at 1J33 (quoting United States v. Baglev. 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)). In Bisner, the 
Court did not reverse, but that was due only to the fact that the defense counsel there actually had 
access to the information at issue. 
4
 Of course, a prosecutor's duty is not simply to convict people, but to "'see that justice is 
done.'1' State v. Gordon. 886 P.2d 112,115 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Walker v. State. 624 
P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981)). Nonetheless, the prosecutor is still not required to "turn over every 
stone or exhaustively pursue every angle searching for exculpatory evidence or other evidence 
that may be helpful to the defendant's preparation of his case." State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, If 10-
12,974P.2d279. 
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'the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Bisner, 2001 UT 99, [^33 
(citations omitted). 
In this case, the application of this test shows that there was a Due Process 
violation. First, the names of the witnesses were not known to the defense until the final 
part of the trial, when an officer testified that the witnesses' names had been taken and 
written in a report that had not been provided to Mr. Crespo. R. 134 [65-66]. At that 
point, there was not time to contact and interview the witnesses, and the officer did not 
even have the information with him. Id. Nor did the trial court allow time by granting a 
continuance or a mistrial. Id. at 72. So, there was never an opportunity for the defense to 
study or use this information. 
Secondly, the witnesses' names were material information that may have been 
exculpatory. For one thing, if the witnesses could substantiate Mr. Crespo's testimony 
that the drugs found near him were not his, or otherwise contradict the officer's 
testimony that he saw Mr. Crespo toss the drugs to the floor, it would greatly strengthen 
his defense. In that event, the outcome at trial would likely be different because 
testimony that corroborates a defendant's statement is much more powerful than a 
defendant's testimony alone. 
The prejudicial affect of giving the defense incorrect witness and testimony 
information has been emphasized by this Court. For instance, in State v. Rugebregt. a 
rape case, the defense asked for information about the testimony of a potential trial 
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witness. Rugebregt. 965 P.2d at 520. The prosecutor said that the witness, a registered 
nurse, would not testify that the alleged victim was raped, but that the victim's injuries 
could have resulted from either consensual or forced intercourse. Ij±_ However, at trial the 
nurse testified that the victim's injuries were made by forcible penetration. Id. at 521-22. 
On review, this Court ruled that the prosecutor did not comply with Due Process and the 
Discovery Rule.5 
Also, in State v. Gordon, this Court analyzed a situation where two witnesses 
testified that they had seen the defendant at an apartment during the middle and end of 
August. Gordon. 886 P.2d at 114-15. However, the defense presented evidence that the 
defendant was at a youth detention facility during that time. Id. at 114. This Court 
acknowledged the importance of fair testimony, and ruled that false testimony must be 
corrected "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the judgment of the jury."6 This is to maintain the integrity of the process of 
obtaining and presenting witnesses. 
In sum, Due Process requires the fair and accurate presentation of relevant 
testimony. Particularly, it requires the prosecutor to properly inform the defense counsel 
of its own witnesses, and any potentially exculpatory witnesses that are known. In this 
5
 Id. at 522. This case was not reversed because the defense waived its right to a remedy 
by failing to make a timely request for one. Id. at 523. 
6
 Id. at 116 (quotations omitted). This case was not reversed because the Court found that 
the false testimony was not prejudicial, and it was sufficiently corrected through cross-
examination. Id. at 116-17. 
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case, the prosecutor had access to the names and other information of witnesses and the 
crime scene, and failed to give this information to Mr. Crespo. This was a violation of 
Due Process, and it prejudiced Mr. Crespo by denying him knowledge of potentially 
exculpatory witnesses in his case. 
The prosecutor's omission also violated the Discovery Rule, Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Crespo made a formal discovery request pursuant to 
Rule 16, so the police report containing the names of witnesses should have been 
provided to him. R. 16-18. This is shown by the request itself. In his request, Mr. Crespo 
asked for f,[a]ny evidence which tends to negate . . . or mitigate" his guilt, a list of all 
witnesses the State intended to call for trial, along with their personal contact 
information, and any reports involved in the prosecution or investigation of this case. R. 
16-17. This request includes police reports with the names of witnesses, and that was not 
provided in this case. 
This discovery omission is unjustifiable. Under Rule 16, once a discovery request 
has been made, the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose this information "as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b) (2003). Also, "[t]he prosecutor has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure." Id This is because the failure to disclose evidence when it becomes available 
may so mislead a defendant that it causes prejudicial error in his case. The Utah Supreme 
Court explained: 
15 
To meet basic standards of fairness and to insure that a trial is a real quest 
for truth and not simply a contest between the parties to win, a defendant's 
request for information which has been voluntarily complied with, or a 
court order of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing request. And 
even though there is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to 
disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falls with[in] the 
ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a voluntary 
disclosure of evidence might so mislead defendant as to cause prejudicial 
error. 
State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 
662 (Utah 1985)). So, even if evidence is not available until well after the initial 
discovery request, the prosecutor must still disclose it. 
Of course, like Due Process, Rule 16 does not require the prosecutor to conduct an 
exculpatory investigation on behalf of a criminal defendant. State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 
75, f 14, 21 P.3d 675. However, if the prosecutor or investigating officers come across 
exculpatory information during their investigation, this must be disclosed to the 
defendant. Id; Pliego. 1999 UT 8, Tfl8. 
In this case, the police gathered the names of those at the crime scene during the 
course of their investigation. Immediately after arriving at the apartment, they detained 
Mr. Crespo and then they searched the apartment and found drug paraphernalia. R. 134 
[42, 64]. Mr. Crespo was arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and 
others were issued with paraphernalia citations. IcL at 65. In the course of this, the police 
got the names of those in the apartment and later recorded them in a report. I&_ at 65-66. 
16 
However, this report was never disclosed to Mr. Crespo at any time during his case.7 
Apparently, this is because Mr. Crespo9s charge was filed under a separate case number 
than the paraphernalia citations, and the witnesses' names were filed with the 
paraphernalia case. Id. at 66. But confusion with the case numbers does not justify the 
State's failure to disclose the witnesses' names. 
Further, the prosecutor's failure to disclose this information was prejudicial to Mr. 
Crespo's case. Potential exculpatory witnesses would have been invaluable in supporting 
Mr. Crespo's testimony that the drugs were not his, and that they belonged to someone 
else in the apartment where he had arrived a few minutes before. Id_ at 75-81. They 
would also have been invaluable in refuting the police officer's testimony that he saw 
Mr. Crespo with the drugs. Id. at 26. Mr. Crespo was entitled to information about these 
witnesses so that he could conduct his own investigation and discover evidence to 
support his case. Because the names of these witnesses were not given, Mr. Crespo's 
defense was crippled. 
Finally, the trial court should have granted the remedy of a mistrial, or imposed a 
continuance, because either of these remedies were reasonable in the circumstances. Rule 
16 indicate!; that a continuance, mistrial, or other remedy should be imposed when proper 
discovery is not given: 
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
7
 Id. at 66. The names of only two of the people, "Mr. Pollock" and "Mr. Lucero," were 
given to Mr. Crespo. Id. at 65. 
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attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, 
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g) (2003). In fact, this Court has noted that Mat a minimum,11 a trial 
court should "grant a continuance of reasonable duration" when material evidence is 
withheld. State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A mistrial is also an 
appropriate remedy,8 especially in a case like this, where an entire list of crime scene 
witnesses was withheld. A mistrial would have allowed the defense an appropriate 
amount of time to obtain the police report, evaluate it, contact the witnesses, interview 
them, and plan a new trial strategy that includes the new exculpatory evidence 
discovered. So, the defense counsel's request for a mistrial should have been granted. 
Alternatively, the trial court should have granted the defense counsel's motion for 
a dismissal. Although this is a remedy of last resort,9 it is a reasonable remedy here 
because Mr. Crespo's defense was crippled by the lack of information about witnesses at 
the crime scene. And, Mr. Crespo's ability to build a defense with this information could 
have been compromised by the time of trial because the witnesses may no longer have 
been available or they may have forgotten the events that took place in the apartment. So, 
8
 See State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a 
defendant's motion for either a continuance or a mistrial would have been proper where the 
prosecution withheld evidence of an exculpatory statement by defendant that contradicted his 
prior confession). 
9
 Id. at 948. 
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a dismissal would have been a reasonable remedy in this case, and it should have been 
granted as an alternative to a mistrial or continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Crespo respectfully requests a reversal of his conviction 
and a remand for a new trial with proper discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j ? 5 ^ day of July, 2003. 
•V^NJ 
HEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
NISA J. SISNEROS (6654) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021911370 FS 
Judge: ' WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Date: March 31, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: nancyw 
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 1, 1959 
Video 
Tape Count: 11 :22 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/11/2003 Guilty 
2. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/11/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
Page 1 
Case No: 021911370 
Date: Mar 31, 2003 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Time on this case to run concurrent 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends to the board that deft receive CTS on this case, 
Dated t h 
* $ ! day of 
WILLIAM X-VBfcfcREl 
D i s t r i c t Courc Jtfdge 
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ADDENDUM B 
Rule 16, Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate-
